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A TORT IN SEARCH OF A REMEDY:  
PRYING OPEN THE COURTHOUSE DOORS 
FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE VICTIMS 
Susan Saab Fortney* 
INTRODUCTION 
The rule of law and access to justice go hand in hand.  International-law 
expert Professor Francesco Francioni describes the connection as follows: 
In international law, as in any domestic legal system, respect and 
protection of human rights can be guaranteed only by the availability of 
effective judicial remedies.  When a right is violated, access to justice is 
of fundamental importance for the injured individual and it is an essential 
component of the system of protection and enforcement of human rights.1 
The Canadian Bar Association Access to Justice Committee takes a similar 
approach, explaining that justice “ensures fairness and equality for all, and 
respect for all who come before it.  Being accorded respect from a justice 
system means being heard and provided with an effective, meaningful 
outcome.”2 
Using this broad connotation of justice, this Article questions whether 
many victims of legal malpractice3 are denied access to justice.  In writing 
 
*  Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, Texas 
A&M University School of Law.  Professor Fortney thanks Professor Bruce Green and the 
members of the Fordham Law Review for their assistance and for including her in the 
fascinating colloquium entitled Civil Litigation Ethics at a Time of Vanishing Trials held at 
Fordham University School of Law.  For an overview of the colloquium, see Judith Resnik, 
Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial:  Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto 
Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 
(2017). 
 
 1. Francesco Francioni, The Rights of Access to Justice Under Customary International 
Law, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT 1 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2007). 
 2. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM., CANADIAN BAR ASS’N, REACHING EQUAL JUSTICE 
REPORT:  AN INVITATION TO ENVISION AND ACT 62 (2013), http://www.cba.org/ 
CBAMediaLibrary/cba_na/images/Equal%20Justice%20-%20Microsite/PDFs/EqualJustice 
FinalReport-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V8M-8JUS].  This definition illustrates how authors 
around the world take a comprehensive view when discussing access to justice.  In the 
United States, the term “access to justice” often refers to access to affordable legal services. 
See, e.g., Access to Justice, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atj (last visited Mar. 
25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/MN4P-R5GC].  In discussing access to justice, this Article takes 
the more inclusive global position on the term “access to justice.” 
 3. This Article uses “legal malpractice” as an umbrella term to cover a range of 
professional liability claims against attorneys, including claims based on negligence, breach 
of fiduciary duty, and intentional torts. See SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY & VINCENT R. JOHNSON, 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW:  PROBLEMS AND PREVENTION 19 (2d ed. 2015). 
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about the regulatory function of legal malpractice as a tort, Professor John 
Leubsdorf argues that legal malpractice relates to three important functions 
of the law of lawyering:  “[D]elineating the duties of lawyers, creating 
appropriate incentives and disincentives for lawyers in their dealings with 
clients and others, and providing access to remedies for those injured by 
improper lawyer behavior.”4  Arguably, persons injured by lawyer 
misconduct are denied access to justice if our civil liability system does not 
provide them access to meaningful redress. 
The economics and common law rules relating to legal malpractice 
claims present significant challenges for persons injured by lawyers’ acts or 
omissions.  Both scholars and practitioners have examined the obstacles 
that a legal malpractice plaintiff must overcome.  For example, a number of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys have posted online commentaries discussing the 
practical problems malpractice plaintiffs face, as well as the dynamics and 
legal principles that impede their ability to prevail and to collect judgments 
and settlements.5  In addition, various scholars have published articles 
examining specific issues that make it difficult for plaintiffs to recover in 
legal malpractice cases.6  Notably, Professors Lawrence W. Kessler and 
Benjamin Barton provide context for why and how the legal system favors 
lawyers in legal malpractice cases.  In his 2002 article, Professor Kessler 
thoughtfully examines how the dynamic of “capture” explains why certain 
liability doctrines have not been incorporated into the tort of legal 
malpractice, preventing those injured by negligent legal services from 
obtaining compensation.7  He argues that lawyers who regulate the bar, 
through their roles as judges, legislators, and advocates, have had their 
neutrality undermined by overidentification with the legal profession.8  As a 
result, he maintains that the “legal malpractice tort, alone, retains defendant 
protections that have been denied to others.”9  To support his argument, 
Professor Kessler examines in depth two discrete malpractice rules that 
 
 4. John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 101, 105 (1995). 
 5. See, e.g., Howard Altschuler, Legal Malpractice Litigation:  Some of What You Need 
to Know BEFORE You Decide Whether to Sue Your Lawyer, LEGAL MALPRACTICE L. CTR. 
(July 31, 2013), http://legal-malpractice.com/legal-malpractice-litigation-some-of-what-you-
need-to-know-before-you-decide-whether-to-sue-your-lawyer/ [https://perma.cc/VVM2-
3V4T]; What Are the Typical Hurdles in a Legal Malpractice Case?, NOWAK & STAUCH, 
http://www.ns-law.net/Practice-Areas/Legal-Malpractice/What-are-the-typical-hurdles-in-a-
legal-malpractice-case.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/26TE-NBNL]. 
 6. See Daniel B. Meyer & Edward C. Eberspacher, My Negligence?:  What About 
Yours?:  Legal Malpractice and a Client’s Comparative Fault, FOR DEF., Oct. 2007, at 18. 
See generally Michael P. Cross & Nicole M. Quintana, Your Place or Mine?:  The Burden of 
Proving Collectability of an Underlying Judgment in a Legal Malpractice Action, 91 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 53 (2014). 
 7. Lawrence W. Kessler, The Unchanging Face of Legal Malpractice:  How the 
“Captured” Regulators of the Bar Protect Attorneys, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 457, 457–58 (2002).  
“Capture is a term developed in the early part of the last century to explain the dynamic 
through which regulatory agencies often failed to zealously restrict the industries that they 
were supposed to regulate.” Id. at 458. 
 8. Id. at 466. 
 9. Id. at 457. 
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favor lawyers.10  He concludes by advocating that the rules be modified “to 
make the legal malpractice tort a viable mechanism for protecting the 
purchasers of legal services.”11 
Professor Barton also questions the close relationship between the 
regulated bar and the judiciary.12  In his seminal piece on judicial bias, he 
proposes the following lawyer-judge hypothesis: 
[M]any legal outcomes can be explained, and future cases predicted, by 
asking a very simple question:  is there a plausible legal result in this case 
that will significantly affect the interests of the legal profession (positively 
or negatively)?  If so, the case will be decided in the way that offers the 
best result for the legal profession.13 
To support his hypothesis, Barton uses a number of examples, including a 
handful of rules in legal malpractice cases that favor lawyer-defendants.14 
Both Professors Barton and Kessler point to the value of exposing the 
prolawyer phenomenon, suggesting that shedding light on judicial bias may 
be “enough to shift the law in some of these areas.”15  As Professor Barton 
states, “Perhaps pointing out the cumulative effects of these unconscious 
decisions [that favor lawyers] will lead to some reforms.”16  Professor 
Kessler makes a similar observation, noting that the solution to capture is 
education.17 
In that same educational spirit, this Article takes a systematic approach to 
examining the obstacles encountered when injured persons seek 
compensation for injuries suffered at the hands of lawyers.  Part I examines 
the numerous hurdles that an injured person must surmount when 
commencing a legal malpractice action.  Assuming that an injured person 
overcomes those obstacles, Part II reviews the difficulties that malpractice 
plaintiffs encounter in pursuing their claims, including the various rules and 
doctrines that favor legal malpractice defendants.  Even after a plaintiff 
obtains a judgment, Part III considers the obstacles that plaintiffs encounter 
in actually collecting on that judgment.  In an attempt to better balance the 
public’s interest in holding lawyers accountable with the lawyer-
 
 10. See id. at 477–91 (analyzing how malpractice defendants are favored by rules related 
to the compensability of emotional harm and deduction of certain attorney’s fees from a 
malpractice verdict). 
 11. Id. at 499. 
 12. See generally Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of 
the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453 (2008). 
 13. Id. at 454. 
 14. See id. at 492–502 (discussing how the law favors defendants in legal malpractice 
cases compared to defendants in medical malpractice cases).  In this examination, Professor 
Barton focuses on requirements for proving causation and establishing privity in legal 
malpractice cases. See id. 
 15. Id. at 503 (explaining that some or all of the effects are the result of unconscious 
judicial bias toward their own experiences and naturally increased empathy for litigants who 
share similar backgrounds and experiences). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Kessler, supra note 7, at 499.  Although capture may not be eliminated, Professor 
Kessler suggests that “a judiciary that is aware of its biases can control them.” Id. 
2036 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
defendant’s interest in having the law not impose unfair burdens,18 Part IV 
proposes specific changes and suggests that attorneys and judges should 
recognize the link between financial accountability and professionalism by 
supporting reforms to provide access to justice to consumers injured by 
lawyer misconduct. 
I.  CHALLENGES IN COMMENCING 
A LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAWSUIT 
Before embarking on a legal action against a lawyer, a prospective 
plaintiff must, of course, recognize that she has a potential malpractice 
claim.  Due to the nature of the attorney-client relationship, however, 
injured persons may be completely unaware that the attorney has engaged 
in misconduct.  From the outset of the representation, most inexperienced 
users of legal services largely lack information to judge their lawyers’ 
conduct.19  Due to the information disparities between lawyers and their 
clients, market principles do not apply to the attorney-client relationship,20 
potentially impacting the ability of clients to control their representation 
and to judge their lawyers’ performance.21  Without adequate information, 
clients may be forced to rely on their lawyers’ explanations of the outcomes 
of representation, unaware of the fact that they were victims of legal 
malpractice.22 
Clients might not be left in the dark if more lawyers recognized that 
ethical rules and fiduciary principles impose duties on them to disclose their 
own malpractice to their clients.  Despite the fact that experts maintain that 
the duty to disclose one’s own malpractice is “well-grounded” in the 
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
 
 18. Professor Vincent R. Johnson makes this point in the following introduction to legal 
malpractice rules: 
In some cases, these rules work to hold lawyers accountable for harm to persons 
resulting from errant practices.  In other cases, the relevant principles insulate 
lawyers from damage awards when it would be unfair to impose legal 
responsibility.  Thus, legal malpractice law attempts to strike a fair balance 
between the public’s interest in consumer protection and the legal profession’s 
need for freedom of action. 
VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 1 (2011). 
 19. See Katherine R. Kruse, The Jurisprudential Turn in Legal Ethics, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 
493, 494 (2011) (“Clients come to lawyers to find out what the law requires, prohibits, or 
allows them to do.”). 
 20. See Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking:  Informed Consent and 
the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 90 (1979) (“The information disparities 
between lawyer and client negate the usual market assumption that, at the beginning of a 
transaction, the buyer can tell the seller exactly what he wants and thereby ‘control’ the 
seller.”). 
 21. See id. at 104 (suggesting that the clients are better prepared to monitor their counsel 
when they receive reliable information and give their informed consent). 
 22. See generally Benjamin P. Cooper, Attorney Self-Disclosure, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 697 
(2010) (discussing information gaps and the theoretical, moral, and public policy 
justifications for requiring lawyers to disclose lawyer-specific information, and proposing an 
amendment to the rules of professional conduct that would require more disclosure). 
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and supported by fiduciary law,23 there is a “dearth of direct authority 
requiring self-reporting.”24  In discussing lawyers’ failure to honor this 
professional and fiduciary duty, Professor Benjamin P. Cooper provides the 
following explanations: 
The lawyer may not believe he or his firm has committed malpractice or 
may otherwise be unaware that he or his firm has committed an act of 
malpractice.  He may be unaware of his duty to report his malpractice.  He 
may want to try to fix the error.  A more sinister explanation is that the 
lawyer has decided to intentionally hide his mistake from his client.25 
Lawyers may be more inclined to disclose their own malpractice if more 
courts recognized an independent cause of action for lawyers’ failure to 
self-report.  Around the United States, reported decisions are split on the 
ability of a client to maintain such a separate claim.26  Until the majority of 
courts recognize a separate cause of action for failure to self-report,27 many 
lawyers may continue to take an ostrich approach to disclosing their own 
malpractice to clients.  As a result, clients may be wholly unaware of the 
basis for a potential legal malpractice claim. 
Developments related to in-firm communications also affect the ability of 
clients to learn information pertinent to ethics and malpractice concerns.  
Starting in the late 1980s, courts began to address the application of the 
attorney-client privilege to internal firm communications between the firm’s 
designated in-house counsel and other firm personnel.28  Early cases that 
addressed this in-firm privilege refused to shield certain communications, 
applying what is referred to as “current-client” or “fiduciary” exceptions to 
the attorney-client privilege.29  In response to those opinions, the organized 
bar pushed for a broader recognition of the in-firm privilege.  In 2013, the 
House of Delegates of the ABA adopted a resolution urging all judicial and 
other governmental bodies to recognize the in-firm privilege and not subject 
it to fiduciary or current-client exceptions.30  Now, the tide has shifted with 
 
 23. Benjamin P. Cooper, The Lawyer’s Duty to Inform His Client of His Own 
Malpractice, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 174, 182–88 (2009); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT rr. 1.4, 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 24. Cooper, supra note 23, at 182. 
 25. Benjamin P. Cooper, When Clients Sue Their Lawyers for Failing to Report Their 
Own Malpractice, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 441, 448–49 (2015). 
 26. See id. at 448 (noting that there have been “surprisingly few reported cases in which 
a client has attempted to assert a separate claim against the lawyer based on the lawyer’s 
failure to report his own malpractice”). 
 27. See id. at 470 (arguing that clients should be able to assert an independent claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty and seek equitable remedies such as fee forfeiture). 
 28. For the seminal article that advocates for the recognition of a broad privilege, see 
Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1721 (2005). 
 29. See Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm Partners Islands unto Themselves?:  An 
Empirical Study of Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS, 271, 297–
300 (1996) (analyzing the first cases that extended the privilege to some communications but 
limited the protection with respect to communications involving current clients). 
 30. Tort Trial & Ins. Practice Section, Am. Bar Ass’n, Report to the House of Delegates:  
Resolution 103, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 2013 ANNUAL MEETING:  RESOLUTIONS 
WITH REPORTS TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 133 (2013), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_delegates/2013__hod_annual_resolutionswithrepo
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more reported opinions allowing firms to shield communications between 
in-firm counsel and firm personnel when communications were made for 
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional services to the law 
firm.31  Various commentaries treat the expanded recognition of the 
privilege as favorable.32  Although the trend may benefit firms that want to 
shield information from clients, it hurts clients who are unaware of possible 
conflicts of interest and other material information impacting the 
representation.33  Rather than encouraging lawyers to disclose their 
malpractice, recognition of a broad privilege may encourage lawyers to 
circle the wagons and shield their communications from current clients.  As 
a result, it may be harder for current clients to discover communications 
related to malpractice committed by their lawyer-fiduciaries.34 
Even when injured persons are aware of a potential legal malpractice 
claim, they face the hurdle of finding an experienced lawyer to pursue it.  
Webpages of a number of legal malpractice plaintiffs’ attorneys describe 
the difficulties that plaintiffs will encounter in suing attorneys.  Unlike 
other plaintiffs’ attorneys who paint bright pictures of possible recovery, 
both the titles and content of these pieces warn prospective clients about the 
hurdles to overcome in legal malpractice cases.35  These online 
commentaries describe the range of dilemmas facing legal malpractice 
plaintiffs, starting with the first step of hiring a competent malpractice 
lawyer to handle the matter. 
For decades, prospective malpractice plaintiffs faced a “conspiracy of 
silence,” meaning that as a matter of professional courtesy lawyers did not 
 
rts.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/TTZ7-NKDF].  “Supporters of the ABA’s position 
argue that internal ethical conversations should be privileged, to encourage lawyers to seek 
ethical advice.” Bruce Rubin & KC Harding, In-House Attorney-Client Privilege in the Wake 
of Crimson Trace, A.B.A. (Aug. 12, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/ 
committees/corporate/articles/summer2014-0814-in-house-attorney-client-privilege-wake-
crimson-trace.html [https://perma.cc/75GR-D4M9]. 
 31. For an overview of the case developments, see Glen R. Olson et al., Ethics and 
Internal Firm Communications Regarding Lawyer Malpractice Claims, 45 BRIEF 52 (2016). 
 32. See, e.g., Karen Rubin, Firm Counsel Privilege Prevails; New York Joins Favorable 
Trend in Recognizing Doctrine, LAW FOR LAW. TODAY (July 14, 2016), 
http://www.thelawforlawyerstoday.com/2016/07/2676/ [https://perma.cc/WZS9-VZGL].  On 
June 30, 2016, a New York state appellate court joined other courts in recognizing that the 
in-firm privilege applies to communications between law firm attorneys and the firm’s in-
house general counsel, even when the communications related to a current client. See Stock 
v. Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP, 35 N.Y.S.3d 31, 33 (App. Div. 2016). 
 33. The Association of Corporate Counsel filed an amicus brief in Crimson Trace Corp. 
v. Davis Write Tremaine LLP, 326 P.3d 1181 (Or. 2014), arguing that the application of 
attorney-client privilege to in-firm communications would corrode trust between in-house 
corporate counsel and outside counsel and would “lead clients to hesitate to seek outside 
legal advice.” Brief of Amicus Curiae Ass’n of Corp. Counsel in Support of Plaintiff-
Adverse Party Crimson Trace Corp. at 3, Crimson Trace, 326 P.3d 1181 (No. S061086), 
2013 WL 5958906, at *3; see also Rubin & Harding, supra note 30. 
 34. In many states, the existence of an ongoing attorney-client relationship will toll the 
statute of limitations. See FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 332–34 (discussing the 
“continuous representation” rule). 
 35. See, e.g., Altschuler, supra note 5; What Are the Typical Hurdles in a Legal 
Malpractice Case?, supra note 5. 
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criticize, sue, or testify against other lawyers.36  Although more lawyers are 
now willing to pursue legal malpractice claims, prospective plaintiffs in 
various circles and communities may still encounter resistance.  Some 
lawyers are unwilling to represent plaintiffs, believing, “There but for the 
grace of God go I.”37  Others may resist taking a case that has the prospect 
of increasing malpractice exposure for all lawyers. 
Persons who succeed in locating a lawyer willing to pursue a malpractice 
case must still carefully screen the lawyer to determine if the lawyer has the 
requisite expertise to handle the matter.  “Understanding what constitutes 
malpractice and figuring what to do next is a complicated procedure, 
especially when you are dealing with the repercussions of a failed legal 
case.”38 
The likelihood of retaining a lawyer with the necessary expertise to 
handle a legal malpractice case will largely turn on the economics of the 
representation.  “Legal malpractice cases are particularly difficult and 
expensive,” partly because lawyers become formidable opponents when 
they believe that their assets and reputations are threatened.39  Thus, either 
the prospective client must possess the means to fund the litigation, or the 
underlying case must have significant value to support a malpractice 
attorney handling the litigation on a contingent fee basis.40  Although 
contingency fee decisions will depend on the particular facts of the 
representation, plaintiffs’ attorneys may require a minimum amount of 
damages, such as $300,000, before the attorney agrees to a contingency 
fee.41 
Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice attorneys are also “rare” because these types 
of professional liability cases generally promise a lower return on the 
attorney’s efforts than other types of cases.42  This is due to both the 
 
 36. FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 10; see Gary N. Schumann & Scott H. 
Herlihy, The Impending Wave of Legal Malpractice Litigation:  Predictions, Analysis, and 
Proposals for Change, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 143, 176–77 (1998) (noting that lawyers’ 
reluctance to sue one another “was much greater fifty or even twenty-five years ago”). 
 37. John Bradford, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (Elizabeth Knowles ed., 5th 
ed. 1999). 
 38. Tips on Suing Your Lawyer for Malpractice, MAKAREM & ASSOCS. (Feb. 28, 2015), 
http://www.makaremlaw.com/tips-suing-lawyer-malpractice/ [https://perma.cc/PAT8-
8WSC]. 
 39. Suing an Attorney for Malpractice Is Harder Than You Think, I DO NOT WANT TO 
BE YOUR LAW. (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.idonotwanttobeyourlawyer.com/suing-an-
attorney-for-malpractice-is-harder-than-you-think/ [https://perma.cc/328U-TP64]. 
 40. One law firm that only handles legal malpractice claims resulting from personal 
injury cases notes that the firm will have to determine that the underlying case had 
“significant value” before deciding to take it on. Legal Malpractice, LAW FIRM REED & 
MANSFIELD, http://www.accidentawardslasvegas.com/additional-services/legal-malpractice-
lawyers/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/U7BT-SW44]. 
 41. In a book written for lay people, one malpractice expert dissuaded clients from 
agreeing to pay attorneys on an hourly basis unless clients believe that they “have an 
outstanding case with a potential recovery in the millions and [the clients] have substantial 
financial resources.” BOYD S. LEMON, EVALUATING A MALPRACTICE CASE AGAINST A 
LAWYER 23 (2006). 
 42. Suing an Attorney for Malpractice Is Harder Than You Think, supra note 39. 
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complexity and the higher costs of trying a legal malpractice case.43  “For 
these simple reasons, only the most promising of legal malpractice cases 
will be considered by the few lawyers willing to practice in this area.”44 
The use of expert testimony contributes to both the cost and complexity 
of legal malpractice cases.45  Under a “‘widely followed rule,’ the plaintiff 
‘in a legal malpractice action . . . must present expert testimony establishing 
the standard of care unless the attorney’s lack of care and skill is so obvious 
that the trier of fact can find negligence as a matter of common 
knowledge.’”46  The role of the expert is to assist the fact-finder in 
understanding the standard of care applicable to the lawyer-defendant’s 
conduct. 
To be able to provide such testimony, experts commonly devote many 
hours to reviewing case material, conducting research, preparing reports or 
affidavits, and preparing to testify.47  Experts typically bill on an hourly 
basis because the common law rules in most jurisdictions prohibit lawyers 
from paying an expert on a contingent fee basis.48  This makes hiring 
experts an expensive proposition.49 
Understanding that hiring experts can be expensive, experienced 
plaintiffs’ attorneys consider expert fees when evaluating the economics of 
pursuing a legal malpractice claim.50  The expense of hiring experts may 
weigh heavily in a plaintiffs’ attorney’s decision to decline handling a claim 
when the amount of recovery would not cover litigation costs.  In many 
cases, the cost of the expert alone may prevent a plaintiff from finding a 
lawyer who will take the case on a contingency fee basis.51 
Assuming a plaintiffs’ attorney determines that the amount of damages 
would support hiring an expert, the next hurdle is finding the “right” expert.  
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. According to one legal malpractice specialist, “One of the reasons why legal 
malpractice cases are generally complex is because a client suing a lawyer needs to hire at 
least two lawyers, the one to bring the suit, and another lawyer from another firm to be the 
expert.” Howard Altschuler, You Have a Legal Malpractice Expert?:  Great . . . but That’s 
Still NOT Good Enough . . ., LEGAL MALPRACTICE L. CTR. (Aug. 27, 2014), http://legal-
malpractice.com/legal-malpractice-expert-great-thats-still-good-enough 
[https://perma.cc/QQ9U-BQP9]. 
 46. FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 77 (quoting Television Capital Corp. of 
Mobile v. Paxson Commc’ns Corp., 894 A.2d 461, 469 (D.C. 2006)). 
 47. See JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 74–75. 
 48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 117 cmt. c (AM. 
LAW INST. 2000) (“A fee paid an expert witness may not be contingent on the content of the 
witness’s testimony or the result in the litigation.”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.5 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 49. See JOHNSON, supra note 18, at 74–75 (reviewing the duties and compensation of 
experts in legal malpractice cases). 
 50. Id. at 75. 
 51. Of course, a plaintiffs’ attorney wants to avoid liability for the cost of hiring experts.  
Unless the lawyer disclaims liability at the time of contracting, a lawyer is liable for the 
compensation of an expert whom the lawyer has hired when the expert provides services 
used by the lawyer and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the expert relies on 
the lawyer’s credit. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 30(2)(b) 
cmt. b. 
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The selection and use of qualified experts can make or break a legal 
malpractice claim.  Thus, a threshold concern in commencing a legal 
malpractice case is for the plaintiff to find an experienced legal malpractice 
attorney who understands the importance of retaining a qualified and 
credible expert.  Recognizing the specialized knowledge that an attorney 
needs to competently handle a legal malpractice case, two experienced 
plaintiffs’ attorneys warned that “counsel desiring to represent clients who 
wish to sue their former lawyers ought to be extremely careful, lest the 
prosecutor become the prosecuted.”52 
II.  CHALLENGES IN TRYING LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 
As discussed in Part I, a plaintiff’s ability to successfully sue her lawyer 
largely depends on hiring an attorney who is experienced in handling legal 
malpractice cases.  Once retained, plaintiffs’ attorneys must be prepared to 
deal with numerous challenges faced by plaintiffs in legal malpractice 
cases.  This part surveys those difficulties, starting with the selection of 
theories of liability to assert. 
A.  Selection of Theories of Liability 
In commencing a lawsuit, the first step for the plaintiff’s counsel is to 
articulate the causes of action that can be established by a preponderance of 
the evidence.  When a plaintiff is suing an attorney, this determination can 
be tricky because “courts . . . are not in agreement on the exact nature of 
and parameters for” the different professional liability claims against 
attorneys.53  Some courts use the term “legal malpractice” to refer only to 
negligence claims.54  Others take the approach used in this Article, using 
the term as an umbrella reference covering different causes of action, 
including negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.55 
A plaintiffs’ attorney must differentiate the theories of liability available 
in the particular jurisdiction.  This is no easy feat because the case law 
across jurisdictions is perplexing and inconsistent.56  For instance, while 
some courts allow claims when the operative facts supporting the breach of 
fiduciary duty and negligence claims are the same, others refuse to do so.57  
This creates both confusion and uncertainty even for the most experienced 
plaintiffs’ attorney who seeks to pursue separate breach of fiduciary duty 
and negligence claims. 
 
 52. Neil J. Dilloff & Albert S. Barr III, Legal Malpractice:  The Plaintiff’s Perspective, 
18 MD. B.J. 6, 8 (1983). 
 53. Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract:  
A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 45 SMU L. REV. 235, 235 (1994). 
 54. See FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 19 (explaining that “legal malpractice” 
traditionally referred to professional negligence claims against lawyers). 
 55. See id. (“Over the years, courts and commentators have taken a more expansive view 
of legal malpractice, using the term to refer to various claims against lawyers.”). 
 56. See Cooper, supra note 25, at 457–58 (referring to the “incoherent doctrine” related 
to breach of fiduciary duty and negligence claims). 
 57. See id. at 458. 
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When possible, a plaintiff should attempt to differentiate liability theories 
by pleading claims separately, marshaling evidence, and obtaining separate 
findings on each cause of action.  An assessment of malpractice cases 
reveals how plaintiffs may face dismissal of claims that courts deem to be 
duplicative.  For example, in Axcess International, Inc. v. Baker Botts, 
L.L.P.,58 the plaintiff asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim and a 
negligence claim.59  The jury charge only included a negligence claim 
because the judge had dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty claim.60  The 
jury awarded the plaintiff $40.5 million on the negligence claim;61 
however, the jury also concluded that the plaintiff should have discovered 
the negligence more than two years before the negligence claim was 
brought.62  Thus, recovery on the negligence claim was barred by the 
applicable two-year statute of limitations.63  Had the plaintiff convinced the 
trial court that the breach of fiduciary duty claim was supported by evidence 
and not duplicative, the plaintiff might have secured a multimillion dollar 
judgment.  As the case illustrates, plaintiffs face real difficulties in pleading 
and proving different causes of action on which judgments can be obtained 
and sustained. 
B.  Establishing the Elements of a Negligence Claim Generally 
In a legal malpractice case based on negligence, the plaintiff carries the 
burden of establishing duty, breach, causation, and damages by a 
preponderance of the evidence.64  Because various defendant-friendly 
protections exist in legal malpractice law, it is very difficult for many 
plaintiffs to carry the burden of proving each element of a negligence 
claim.65 
Starting with duty, the first element of a negligence claim, a plaintiff 
must establish that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.  
Lawyers clearly owe a duty of care to their clients; however, duties owed to 
prospective clients and nonclients are far more limited.66  “Traditionally, 
nonclients found lack of privity to be a serious obstacle to bringing claims 
 
 58. No. 05-14-01151-CV, 2016 WL 1162208 (Tex. App. Mar. 24, 2016). 
 59. Id. at *3; see Jess Krochtengel, Baker Botts Dodges $41M Verdict in IP Malpractice 
Trial, LAW360 (May 15, 2014, 12:51 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/537619/baker-
botts-dodges-41m-verdict-in-ip-malpractice-trial [https://perma.cc/4H4B-85EE]. 
 60. Axcess Int’l, 2016 WL 1162208, at *1; see Krochtengel, supra note 59. 
 61. See Krochtengel, supra note 59. 
 62. Axcess Int’l, 2016 WL 1162208, at *1. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 45. 
 65. Compare Kessler, supra note 7, at 457 (asserting that the “legal malpractice tort, 
alone, retains defendant protections that have been denied to others,” such as defendants in 
medical malpractice and products liability cases), with Barton, supra note 12, at 491 (“It is 
much harder to prove legal malpractice than medical malpractice . . . because the legal 
profession has enjoyed several unique advantages as defendants in malpractice actions, and 
doctrinal changes that have applied in medical malpractice have been barred or adopted 
much more slowly in legal malpractice [actions].”). 
 66. See FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 34–35, 47–52 (discussing how the 
plaintiff’s relationship with the attorney-defendant affects standing and the ability to pursue 
different types of claims). 
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against lawyers who did not represent them.”67  Although various courts 
have eroded the privity requirement, some states continue to adhere to a 
strict privity rule.68  Even in states that allow certain types of third-party 
claims, the tests for third-party liability make it very difficult for nonclients 
to sue attorneys.69  In addition, some states have adopted statutory limits on 
attorneys’ liability to nonclients.70 
Next, the plaintiff must tackle the second element of the negligence 
claim:  breach.  As noted above, a plaintiff generally must present expert 
testimony related to the breach of the standard of care.71  From the 
perspective of a plaintiff seeking damages of less than six figures, the 
expert requirement may make the case economically infeasible to pursue.72 
The economics of a legal malpractice case and the availability of legal 
malpractice as a remedy could completely change in some cases if a 
plaintiff could rely on negligence per se doctrine and pursue a negligence 
claim based on the defendant’s violation of applicable disciplinary rules.73  
Unfortunately, from the standpoint of a plaintiff, such an effort will be 
unsuccessful because of language included in the preface to the applicable 
disciplinary rules.  Specifically, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
and the state versions of those rules expressly provide that the disciplinary 
rules do not define standards of civil liability for professional conduct.74  
Despite the criticism of this language as being “self-serving economic 
protectionism, drafted by the organized bar,” courts continue to point to this 
language.75  This language effectively guts a plaintiff’s ability to rely on 
negligence per se.76 
C.  Proving Causation with a Trial Within a Trial 
Although the duty and breach elements present hurdles for legal 
malpractice plaintiffs, proving causation may be the most complex aspect of 
 
 67. Id. at 180. 
 68. See Tom W. Bell, Limits on the Privity and Assignment of Legal Malpractice 
Claims, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1535–36 (1992). 
 69. See Barton, supra note 12, at 498. 
 70. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-310 (2016) (stating that licensed attorneys shall not 
be liable to persons not in privity, subject to limited exceptions). 
 71. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 72. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 73. With negligence per se, the unexcused violation of a standard-setting legislative 
enactment is conclusive proof of breach of duty. See FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, 
JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 17.6 (3d ed. 2007). 
 74. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (noting that a 
violation of a rule “should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should 
it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached”). 
 75. See Gary A. Munneke & Anthony E. Davis, The Standard of Care in Legal 
Malpractice:  Do the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Define It?, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 
82–83 (1998) (arguing that violations of the ethics rules should raise an inference of 
negligence, rather than a presumption of negligence or negligence per se). 
 76. Although a minority of courts have found that an ethical violation creates a 
rebuttable presumption of legal malpractice, the majority uses the approach reflected in the 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, which treats violations of ethics rules as 
evidence of professional misconduct. See FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 36–37. 
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a legal malpractice claim.  Regardless of whether the alleged malpractice 
arose out of civil or criminal representation, the plaintiff must prove both 
factual and legal causation.77 
1.  Civil Litigation 
To establish factual causation where the underlying representation 
involves a civil matter, the malpractice plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that “but for” the lawyer-defendant’s 
misconduct, the harm would not have occurred and the plaintiff would have 
obtained a more favorable judgment.78  This often means, however, that 
there must be a “trial within a trial” in which all of the “issues that would 
have been litigated in the previous action are litigated between the plaintiff 
and the plaintiff’s former lawyer, with the latter taking the place and 
bearing the burdens that properly would have fallen on the defendant in the 
original action.”79  Over twenty-five years ago, Professor Joseph Koffler 
asserted that this alignment of burdens is “not consistent with common law 
principles as it is not an adversarial proceeding between the real parties in 
interest in the underlying action.”80 
2.  Settlements 
One causation twist relates to the application of the trial-within-a-trial 
requirement when a plaintiff settled the underlying civil action, allegedly 
relying on the lawyer’s advice.  These so-called “settle-and-sue” cases 
should fit within the trial-within-a-trial framework as follows: 
The settling client should have to prove not just that he would have won 
the underlying case, but that he also would have recovered more than the 
amount of the settlement in that trial.  The difference between the 
theoretical recovery in the underlying case and the settlement would 
constitute the client’s damages.81 
Although many courts have allowed settle-and-sue claims to go forward, 
others have rejected them, largely treating the claims as speculative.82  A 
few courts have determined that allowing plaintiffs to sue their lawyers 
after experiencing settlor’s remorse would violate strong public policy that 
encourages settlements.83  From the perspective of plaintiffs, those courts 
 
 77. See id. at 101–02. 
 78. See id. at 102–03 (suggesting that a defendant may be able to escape liability by 
convincing the trier of fact that the plaintiff’s harm was caused by something other than the 
defendant’s negligence). 
 79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000). 
 80. Joseph H. Koffler, Legal Malpractice Damages in a Trial Within a Trial:  A Critical 
Analysis of Unique Concepts:  Areas of Unconscionability, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 40, 41 (1989). 
 81. Michael L. O’Donell & Christopher P. Montville, New Strategies for Defending 
Professional Liability Claims, in BEST PRACTICES FOR ADDRESSING PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY 
CLAIMS 35, 41 (2015). 
 82. See id. at 42 & n.11. 
 83. See Muhammad v. Strassburger, 587 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Pa. 1991).  In resolving the 
case in light of the “longstanding public policy” that encourages settlements, the 
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that reject the settle-and-sue claims effectively immunize lawyers from civil 
liability for claims arising out of settlements.84  Even in jurisdictions that 
allow malpractice claims arising out of settlements, plaintiffs’ attorneys 
may decline to handle these cases because they feel like winning that kind 
of malpractice claim is too difficult.85 
3.  Transactional Matters 
When the alleged misconduct arose in connection with an attorney’s 
handling of transactional matters, courts require the plaintiff to demonstrate 
that an underlying position was compromised or negatively impacted due to 
the negligence of the lawyer-defendant.86  Although transactional 
representation does not involve an underlying case, the term “trial within a 
trial” may still be used to describe the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that 
the attorney compromised a meritorious underlying position.87  When the 
underlying transaction was complex, it tends to be a herculean feat for the 
plaintiff to satisfy its burden without confusing the jury. 
4.  Criminal Cases 
The application of causation principles also provides a great deal of 
protection to criminal defense attorneys.  Notwithstanding that a plaintiff 
may be able to establish unequivocally that the defense attorney’s conduct 
fell below the applicable standard of care, the criminal defendant must 
prove more than the trial within a trial:  in the great majority of 
jurisdictions, criminal defendants must either obtain postconviction relief or 
prove that they were actually innocent.88  Although courts use different 
approaches, a legal malpractice plaintiff’s unlawful conduct generally 
shields lawyer-defendants from liability for their misconduct.89 
 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded, “Simply stated, we will not permit a suit to be filed 
by a dissatisfied plaintiff against his attorney following a settlement to which that plaintiff 
agreed, unless that plaintiff can show he was fraudulently induced to settle the original 
action.” Id. at 1348. But see Thomas v. Bethea, 718 A.2d 1187, 1193 (Md. 1998) (noting that 
the Muhammad decision represents a “distinct minority view”). 
 84. In repudiating authority that limits the ability of a plaintiff to sue following 
settlement, the New Jersey Supreme Court explained: 
Although we encourage settlements, we recognize that litigants rely heavily on the 
professional advice of counsel when they decide whether to accept or reject offers 
of settlement, and we insist that the lawyers of our state advise clients with respect 
to settlements with the same skill, knowledge, and diligence with which they 
pursue all other legal tasks. 
Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 607 A.2d 1298, 1304 (N.J. 1992). 
 85. See, e.g., Legal Malpractice, supra note 40 (explaining why the firm declines to 
handle postsettlement legal malpractice cases). 
 86. See John M. Palmeri & Franz Hardy, Application of the “Case Within a Case” 
Standard, FOR DEF., Mar. 2008, at 48–49 (noting that the majority of courts have applied the 
case-within-a-case standard to transactional malpractice claims). 
 87. See id. at 49. 
 88. See Vincent R. Johnson, The Unlawful Conduct Defense in Legal Malpractice, 77 
UMKC L. REV. 43, 63–64, 64 nn.131–32 (2008). 
 89. Some courts focus on causation, treating the unlawful conduct as an obstacle the 
plaintiff must overcome in the prima facie case. See id. at 76–77 (citing Shahbaz v. Horwitz, 
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The case of Peeler v. Hughes & Luce90 illustrates the harshness of the 
majority rule.  In that case, Carol Peeler was accused of criminal tax fraud 
and represented by a partner in a prestigious firm.  Facing the possibility of 
incarceration and losing custody over her minor children, Peeler entered a 
guilty plea.91  Thereafter, Peeler sued her attorney for legal malpractice, 
asserting that the partner “failed to tell her that the United Stated Attorney 
had offered her absolute transactional immunity.”92  In support of her 
negligence claim, Peeler relied on the affidavit of the prosecutor stating that 
he had offered immunity through her defense lawyer.93  In response to the 
negligence claim, the firm filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
basis of the plea and conviction.94  The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the 
trial court’s dismissal of the negligence claim because Peeler’s conviction 
was not overturned.95  Joining with the majority of courts, the court held 
that “plaintiffs who have been convicted of a criminal offense may negate 
the sole proximate cause bar to their claim for legal malpractice in 
connection with that conviction only if they have been exonerated on direct 
appeal, through post-conviction relief, or otherwise.”96  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the lawyer’s 
misconduct deprived her of the opportunity to escape prosecution entirely 
because she was unaware of the immunity offer.97 
In Peeler, the Supreme Court of Texas effectively declined to apply the 
“loss of chance” doctrine, under which a plaintiff should be compensated 
when a defendant’s tortious conduct “destroys or reduces a victim’s 
prospects for achieving a more favorable outcome.”98  While some courts 
have applied the loss of chance doctrine in medical malpractice cases, 
lawyer-defendants in the United States have largely been successful in 
convincing courts that the doctrine should not extend to legal malpractice.99 
 
No. G037299, 2008 WL 808034, at *9–10 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2008)).  Others allow 
attorneys to use the unlawful conduct as a defense. See id. at 62–77.  In both camps, the dicta 
in opinions commonly make public policy arguments for not allowing criminal wrongdoers 
to benefit. See id. 
 90. 909 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1995). 
 91. See id. at 498. 
 92. See id. at 496. 
 93. See id. at 498. 
 94. See id. at 496. 
 95. Id. at 498.  As explained by the court, as a matter of law, it was the plaintiff’s 
“illegal conduct rather than the negligence of a convict’s counsel that is the cause in fact of 
any injuries flowing from the conviction, unless the conviction has been overturned.” Id. 
 96. Id. at 497–98. 
 97. Id. at 498 (“The lost opportunity of an admittedly guilty person to escape 
prosecution because of her lawyer’s negligence does not override the public policy against 
shifting the consequences of a crime to a third party.”). 
 98. Joseph H. King, Jr., “Reduction of Likelihood” Reformulation and Other Retrofitting 
of the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 491, 492 (1998). 
 99. See Benjamin Lajoie, Reopening the Discussion of the Loss of Opportunity Doctrine 
in New Hampshire:  A Look at Decisions Made in Light of Current Times, 13 U.N.H. L. REV. 
99, 105 (2015) (noting that jurisdictions are “relatively evenly split on whether to hold 
doctors liable in situations where the doctor has deprived the patient of an opportunity for 
better outcome”).  For a discussion of courts’ rejection of the doctrine in legal malpractice 
cases, see FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 116–17.  Professors Barton and Kessler 
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A court could entertain the loss of chance doctrine to mitigate the 
harshness of a strict “but for” test.  For example, in Vahila v. Hall,100 the 
Supreme Court of Ohio reversed a summary judgment in favor of the 
lawyer-defendant, concluding that it would be inequitable to always require 
plaintiffs to prove that they would have been successful in the underlying 
matter.101  As stated by the court, a “strict ‘but for’ test also ignores 
settlement opportunities lost due to the attorney’s negligence.”102  Despite 
the persuasive rationale for the loss of chance doctrine described in Vahila, 
scholars who have examined the viability of loss of chance doctrine in legal 
malpractice cases suggest that it is an uphill battle for plaintiffs because of 
the judicial bias in favor of the legal profession and captured regulators who 
craft and apply rules that protect lawyers.103 
5.  Obstacles Caused by the 
Trial-Within-a-Trial Requirement Generally 
Due to the trial-within-a-trial requirement, the lawyer-defendant defends 
her case by demonstrating that the plaintiff would not have prevailed in that 
underlying action.  In attempting to destroy the plaintiff’s case, the lawyer-
defendant may have the ability to use the plaintiff’s confidences to poke 
holes in the plaintiff’s case.  While representing the plaintiff in the 
underlying action, the attorney likely learned about the weaknesses in the 
plaintiff’s case, obtaining confidential information from the plaintiff and 
others.104  Once sued, the attorney may use those confidences against the 
plaintiff, turning the fiduciary relationship on its head.105 
Moreover, the trial-within-a-trial requirement often makes the legal 
malpractice claim both complex and costly.  In addition to presenting 
evidence to prove the lawyer-defendant’s malpractice, the plaintiff must call 
witnesses and offer other evidence to establish that the plaintiff would have 
prevailed in prosecuting or defending the underlying case.106  This is 
especially difficult when the underlying case was never tried or when the 
passage of time makes admissible evidence unavailable.107  From the 
standpoint of obtaining evidence, another complication may be obtaining 
 
point to courts’ refusals to apply loss of chance doctrine in legal malpractice cases as an 
example of captured regulators and judicial bias in favor of the legal profession. See Barton, 
supra note 12, at 494–96; Kessler, supra note 7, at 474–77. 
 100. 674 N.E.2d 1164 (Ohio 1997). 
 101. Id. at 1170 (concluding that such a requirement would be “unjust, making any 
recovery virtually impossible for those who truly have a meritorious legal malpractice 
claim”). 
 102. Id. at 1169. 
 103. See Barton, supra note 12, at 494–96; Kessler, supra note 7, at 473–77. 
 104. See Barton, supra note 12, at 493 (stating that the “original attorney may know the 
facts, law, and weaknesses of the case backwards and forwards”). 
 105. See Koffler, supra note 80, at 75 (stating that “legal doctrine in this area 
surreptitiously mocks the fiduciary relationship of the attorney to the client”). 
 106. See Developments in the Law—Lawyers’ Responsibilities and Lawyers’ Responses, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1568 (1994). 
 107. Id. at 1568–69. 
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discovery from the defendant in the underlying case because the defendant 
is not a party in the legal malpractice case.108 
The layers of complexity involved in having a trial within a trial also 
contribute to jury confusion.109  To present the case to the jury in a way that 
they can understand, a plaintiff needs an experienced malpractice attorney.  
Ironically, veteran malpractice attorneys may be the hardest to convince to 
accept representation, precisely because they understand how procedural 
and substantive law protects defendants.  This points to what one plaintiffs’ 
attorney characterizes as the “biggest advantage” for defendants stemming 
from the trial-within-a-trial method:  the “meritorious cases which are never 
filed because of the costs and complexities associated with litigating two 
cases.”110 
Finally, for both transactional- and litigation-based legal malpractice 
cases, it may not be enough for the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the plaintiff would have prevailed.  The majority of 
jurisdictions require that the plaintiff show that the underlying claim would 
have been collectable.111  From the standpoint of a plaintiff who relied on 
the lawyer-defendant to screen and prosecute a claim, query whether it is 
fair to require the plaintiff to establish collectability to recover in the 
malpractice case.  Absent some showing that the attorney warned that the 
underlying judgment might not be collectable, should the attorney be able 
to rely on collectability to escape liability for malpractice?112 
D.  Damages and Attorney’s Fees 
Scholars have argued that the treatment of damages, the final element of 
a negligence claim, in the context of legal malpractice claims also reflects a 
bias in favor of the legal profession.113  As with other tort claims, legal 
malpractice plaintiffs must establish compensatory damages with 
reasonable certainty.  What is different about legal malpractice cases is that 
certain types of damages are not available in these cases.  Most notably, 
emotional distress damages generally are not recoverable in legal 
 
 108. See id. at 1569; see also Jeffrie D. Boysen, Comment, Shifting the Burden of Proof 
on Causation in Legal Malpractice Actions, 1 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 
308, 329 (2011). 
 109. See FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 104–05. 
 110. Daniel L. Abrams, When Case-Within-a-Case Method Helps Plaintiffs Prove Legal 
Malpractice, N.Y. LEGAL ETHICS REP. (May 1, 2015), http://www.newyorklegalethics.com/ 
when-case-within-a-case-method-helps-plaintiffs-prove-legal-malpractice/ (suggesting that 
legal malpractice litigators must carefully consider their clients’ positions in a trial within a 
trial) [https://perma.cc/55NA-ZRYP]. 
 111. See Barton, supra note 12, at 492.  Some jurisdictions treat the issues of 
collectability of a judgment as “a matter constituting avoidance or mitigation of damages,” 
an issue that must be “pleaded and proved by the defendant as an affirmative defense.” 
FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 113. 
 112. See Barton, supra note 12, at 497 (arguing that the burden of proof on causation 
should be shifted to the defendant before the lawyer-defendant “accepted the employment 
and pursued the [underlying] case before it was allegedly lost through her incompetence”). 
 113. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 7, at 477–91. 
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malpractice cases.114  “Although the clients who have been victimized by 
negligent counsel may have lost their homes, the custody of their children, 
their freedom, or their life’s savings, in most jurisdictions, lawyers are 
immune from the common obligation to compensate for the emotional harm 
that they have caused.”115 
Finally, the rules on recovery of attorney’s fees work to the disadvantage 
of legal malpractice plaintiffs.  Generally speaking, plaintiffs will not be 
able to successfully recover the attorney’s fees associated with bringing the 
malpractice case.  Specifically, in jurisdictions whose courts have taken the 
position that a legal malpractice claim sounds in tort, rather than contract, it 
will be difficult for a plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees incurred in pursuing 
claims against the lawyer-defendant, even if the state allows for recovery of 
attorney’s fees for breach of contract cases. 
E.  Affirmative Defenses 
Assuming that a plaintiff successfully overcomes these obstacles and 
establishes the elements of the malpractice claim, the plaintiff must still 
deal with affirmative defenses, many of which favor defendants.  With 
these affirmative defenses, a defendant can escape liability by establishing 
an independent reason why the plaintiff should not recover.116  Although an 
exhaustive discussion of affirmative defenses is outside the scope of this 
Article, the following discussion outlines how certain defenses sweep 
broadly, shielding lawyer-tortfeasors. 
An affirmative defense can be based on arbitration provisions in a 
retainer agreement.117  Over the last two decades, lawyers have increasingly 
included arbitration provisions in their client agreements.118  They feel 
more confident in doing so because a number of court and ethics opinions 
have condoned the use of binding arbitration provisions by attorneys.119  
Although a few courts have declined to enforce the provisions, the majority 
has enforced them, forcing clients to arbitrate fee disputes as well as legal 
malpractice claims.120  Ethics opinions have also given lawyers a green 
 
 114. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 20.11 (5th ed. 
2000) (“With some jurisdictional exceptions, the rule is that damages for emotional injuries 
are not recoverable if they are a consequence of other damages caused by the attorney’s 
negligence.”). 
 115. Kessler, supra note 7, at 478.  Professor Kessler argues that the following 
justifications for disallowing emotional distress damages are not persuasive:  pain and 
suffering is not foreseeable, emotional harm is speculative, and limiting damages for 
emotional harm is not necessary “to insure representation for all.” Id. at 477–91. 
 116. See generally Rain Levy Minns-Fink, Insuring a Civil Confession in Texas:  
Strategies for Alleging and Challenging Affirmative Defenses, 37 ADVOCATE 57 (2006).  For 
an overview of the most important affirmative defenses asserted by legal malpractice 
defendants, see FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 291–357. 
 117. See FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 354. 
 118. See Ashley Carleton, An Ethics Analysis of Arbitrating Malpractice Claims, 27 J. 
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 445, 445 (2015). 
 119. Id. at 446–47. 
 120. See id. at 446, 456–60 (surveying the “change in tide” to accept arbitration 
provisions). 
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light to force aggrieved clients into arbitration, provided that the retainer 
agreement meets certain conditions, such as disclosure of the advantages 
and disadvantages of arbitration.121 
From the standpoint of an aggrieved client, arbitration means that the 
client relinquishes the protections afforded by an open-court process, 
including right to discovery and appellate review.122  Most importantly, the 
clients forfeit their right to a jury trial before their peers.123  Even in 
jurisdictions that require that lawyers disclose the consequences of a 
prospective client agreeing to an arbitration provision, query whether most 
clients will object to the provisions.  In particular, prospective clients of 
modest means may agree to those provisions, effectively forfeiting their 
access to courts when they want to pursue a legal malpractice claim.  
Clients may only fully appreciate the effect of the arbitration provision 
when they unsuccessfully attempt to hire a plaintiffs’ attorney who declines 
representation due to the arbitration provision.124 
Other affirmative defenses involve assignability and immunity.  Due to 
public policy concerns, the majority of jurisdictions treat legal malpractice 
claims as not assignable; thus, the lawyer-defendant might be able to 
summarily defeat a plaintiff who has been assigned a legal malpractice 
claim.125  Moreover, depending on the jurisdiction, the lawyer-defendant 
may be able to rely on the broad litigation privilege applicable to statements 
made in lawsuits126 and the immunity available to certain groups of 
lawyers, such as public defenders.127 
Even for plaintiffs who successfully get to the courthouse, other 
affirmative defenses can bar recovery.  One relates to the unlawful conduct 
of the plaintiffs.  As explained above, the unlawful conduct of the plaintiff 
may prevent the plaintiff from proving causation as part of the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case.128  In other jurisdictions, the defendant may assert the 
 
 121. For a survey of ABA and state ethics opinions, see Chrissy L. Schwennsen, 
Arbitration Clauses in Fee Retainer Agreements, 3 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & 
ETHICS 330, 341–43 (2013). 
 122. See Mark R. Trachtenbert & Christina F. Crozier, Risky Business:  Altering the 
Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards by Contract, 69 TEX. B.J. 868, 868 (2006) 
(“Judicial review of an arbitration award is ‘extremely narrow’ and focuses on the integrity 
of the arbitration process, rather than the propriety of the result.”). 
 123. See FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 354. 
 124. Unless the jurisdiction has addressed the enforceability of predispute arbitration 
provisions in attorney-client retainer agreements, a plaintiffs’ attorney may be unwilling to 
file suit and face the motion to compel arbitration. 
 125. See Kevin Pennell, Note, On the Assignment of Legal Malpractice Claims:  A 
Contractual Solution to a Contractual Problem, 82 TEX. L. REV. 481, 481–82 (2003). 
 126. See Louise Lark Hill, The Litigation Privilege:  Its Place in Contemporary 
Jurisprudence, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 401, 403 (2015) (explaining that some jurisdictions treat 
the litigation privilege as an affirmative defense and others as an immunity from civil 
action). 
 127. “Many states have granted public defenders qualified immunity from suit for acts or 
omissions made in the course of ‘executing their official duties,’ regardless of whether the 
attorney had been found ineffective.” Joseph H. Ricks, Raising the Bar:  Establishing an 
Effective Remedy Against Ineffective Counsel, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1115, 1123. 
 128. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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affirmative defense of in pari delicto or rely on the unlawful conduct or 
unclean hands doctrines.129  Rather than allowing lawyer-defendants to 
escape liability by relying on in pari delicto or the unclean hands doctrine, 
Professor Vincent Johnson suggests that courts use a more equitable 
approach when a defendant asserts contributory negligence, comparative 
negligence, or comparative fault as an affirmative defense.130 
III.  CHALLENGES IN OBTAINING RECOVERY 
When malpractice plaintiffs overcome the hurdles discussed above and 
obtain judgments, they still may not be able to collect the judgment.  Unless 
the lawyer carries insurance or possesses adequate nonexempt assets to 
cover the liability, the plaintiff may be left with an uncollectible judgment.  
This part briefly considers why uncollectability poses a serious risk for 
malpractice plaintiffs. 
The risk boils down to the fact that only one state in the United States—
Oregon—requires professional liability insurance for lawyers.131  Unlike 
other countries, such as Canada and Australia, which require that lawyers 
maintain at least the minimum limits of liability, lawyers in the United 
States are largely free to practice without insurance.132 
Although the precise percentage of uninsured lawyers is not known, the 
likelihood of being represented by an uninsured lawyer is significant.133  
This is especially true for clients represented by solo and small firm 
practitioners.134  According to data reported in the 2016 registration process 
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in Illinois, 41.1 percent of solo lawyers did not carry malpractice 
insurance.135 
Lawyers in the United States do not carry insurance for a variety of 
reasons.  First, lawyers commonly report that they do not carry insurance, 
because of its cost or their inability to afford it.136  Other lawyers in private 
practice may not carry insurance because they practice on a part-time basis 
or practice with little or no profit.137  Interestingly, some lawyers, such as 
criminal defense lawyers, have admitted that they do not carry insurance, 
because they are rarely sued or found liable for malpractice.138  A 
perplexing explanation for lawyers “going bare” is that many apparently do 
not believe that they have a professional obligation to maintain insurance or 
assets to be available in the event of a claim.139  Some of these lawyers may 
think that insurance “put[s] a target on [their] backs,” believing that they 
may not be sued if they do not carry insurance.140 
When lawyers do carry professional liability insurance, another 
collectability risk relating to coverage limitations arises.  Insurers use 
language in their insuring agreements, exclusions, and definitions to limit 
coverage.  For example, to eliminate coverage for punitive damages, the 
insuring agreement may state that the insurer “agrees to pay on behalf of the 
Insured all sums in excess of the deductible that the Insured shall become 
legally obligated to pay as damages.”141  One must read the definitions to 
learn that “damages” does not include “punitive or exemplary amounts.”142 
Common coverage exclusions eliminate coverage for fraud, intentional 
acts, and business transactions with clients.143  Over the last twenty years, 
insurers have added new exclusions and policy language to limit their 
exposure.  For example, insurers revised policy language to limit liability 
for claims relating to legal services performed when the insured was a 
lawyer at a prior law firm.144  Unless the lateral lawyer has insurance under 
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a prior firm’s policy or the lawyer maintained personal assets to pay a 
judgment, an injured person may be left without recovery. 
From the standpoint of accountability and financial responsibility, 
perhaps the most troubling conduct that impacts malpractice victims is that 
some lawyers may intentionally “make their pockets shallow” by sheltering 
assets and forgoing insurance.145  Although others in business may resort to 
such conduct to minimize their liability exposure, lawyers “who espouse the 
status of law as a profession should recognize financial responsibility as a 
professional virtue and promote it as such.”146 
IV.  INITIATIVES TO PROVIDE MORE ACCESS 
TO MALPRACTICE VICTIMS 
The above survey of challenges faced by malpractice plaintiffs paints an 
arduous, but accurate, picture of the journey, starting with hiring a 
malpractice lawyer to collecting a judgment.  The discussion of the uphill 
battle for plaintiffs may help regulators, jurists, and concerned lawyers 
better appreciate the unfairness of the status quo and rethink current 
approaches.  This part identifies changes and initiatives designed to provide 
more access to justice for victims of legal malpractice, especially those of 
modest means. 
In considering changes, a starting point is to rethink the standards and 
procedures used in professional liability cases against lawyers.  This 
examination requires consideration of rules and legal principles that apply 
to elements of a legal malpractice case, including the strict application of a 
privity rule in some jurisdictions.147 
Another concern relates to the proof of causation and the trial-within-a-
trial requirement.  Depending on the alleged misconduct, the plaintiff 
should not be limited to a “but for” showing.  As with medical malpractice 
cases in some jurisdictions, plaintiffs should be allowed to rely on the loss 
of chance doctrine and on the relaxed “substantial factor” test as permitted 
in some breach of fiduciary duty cases.  For claims against criminal defense 
lawyers, more high courts should join the handful of jurisdictions that 
recognize the inequity of requiring a plaintiff to establish actual innocence 
or obtain postconviction relief. 
Implementing changes related to experts can also provide more access to 
malpractice victims, especially those whose claims for damages are less 
than six figures.  Because expert witness fees make smaller legal 
malpractice cases cost prohibitive, judges should carefully consider whether 
expert testimony is necessary.  Currently, the category of cases in which 
expert testimony is unnecessary is very narrow.  It is largely limited to 
situations when the common knowledge of jurors is extensive enough to 
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enable them to discern the attorney’s misconduct from the facts.148  In the 
interest of allowing more malpractice victims to pursue claims, judges 
should scrutinize situations to determine if expert testimony is necessary to 
assist the trier of fact.  In bench trials, judges may be able to take judicial 
notice of standards of care under certain circumstances.  In other cases, 
judges should not grant summary judgment or directed verdicts on the basis 
of no expert testimony.  Rather, judges could allow more cases to go 
forward without experts, leaving the question of the necessity of an expert 
to be evaluated on appeal. 
Another alternative to the expensive battle of experts is for parties to 
mutually agree to share the same expert.  Occasionally, malpractice insurers 
suggest this approach in situations such as ones where the parties recognize 
that the liability question turns on the reasonableness of the defendant’s 
conduct. 
A related move would be for the court to appoint experts under the 
authority of Federal Rule of Evidence 706 or state versions of that rule.149  
The use of court-appointed experts changes the economics of a case 
because courts may obligate parties to split the expert fees and expenses.150 
Costs associated with the legal malpractice cases might also be cut if 
courts provided more latitude to experts.  For example, allowing more 
experts to testify on the basis of hypothetical scenarios could reduce the 
amount of time that experts must devote to preparing for depositions and 
trial. 
On the issue of causation, some jurisdictions shift the burden of proof to 
the lawyer-defendant.151  More courts should be willing to shift the burden 
in situations such as ones where the plaintiff will not be able to prove the 
merits of underlying claims, because the alleged malpractice related to the 
failure of the defendant to discover evidence.152 
In addition to shifting burdens and cutting costs, the attractiveness of a 
legal malpractice claim would also be impacted if courts changed rules 
currently applied to damages and attorney’s fees.  Specifically, courts 
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should be more willing to allow plaintiffs to recover emotional distress 
damages.  In addition, courts could allow more use of fee forfeiture as a 
remedy.  Beyond providing compensation to the individual plaintiff, 
recognition of different types of damages and equitable remedies 
“stimulates others to seek legal remedies for their injuries.”153 
Regulators and bar associations could also take steps to improve the 
likelihood of a plaintiff being able to collect judgments.  Progressive 
jurisdictions could join Oregon and countries around the world in requiring 
malpractice insurance for attorneys in private practice.  Short of requiring 
insurance or requiring lawyers to demonstrate that they have sufficient 
nonexempt assets to pay malpractice judgments, states should require 
lawyers to disclose directly to clients the fact that the lawyer does not 
maintain insurance.154  Data suggest that rigorous disclosure requirements 
may help reduce the number of uninsured lawyers.155 
For those situations where lawyers have engaged in serious misconduct 
that is not covered by malpractice insurance, injured persons should be able 
to submit claims to the state’s client protection funds.156  Where possible, 
bar associations and state supreme courts should evaluate the conditions 
and caps set forth in program guidelines. 
Even with these changes, pursuing a legal malpractice claim through the 
courts may not be feasible for many consumers with relatively small claims 
for damages.  In situations where the alleged misconduct violates state 
disciplinary rules, the disciplinary system may be able to provide a forum 
for resolving disputes.  Although disciplinary authorities in the United 
States may order restitution in limited circumstances, regulators abroad are 
using approaches to provide more redress to consumers.  For example, a 
new regulatory scheme in Victoria, Australia, empowers the legal services 
commissioner to order compensation up to $25,000 to resolve consumer 
complaints, such as ones involving losses because of poor service.157  In 
England and Wales, a legal ombudsman functions as an independent body 
charged with resolving disputes between lawyers and solicitors.158  
Interestingly, the legal ombudsman follows a process that includes features 
of mediation and arbitration.  First, the legal ombudsman attempts to 
resolve informally the dispute between the consumer and the solicitor.159  If 
the parties cannot resolve the dispute, the disagreement goes back to the 
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legal ombudsman for a decision.160  When the legal ombudsman finds in 
favor of a complainant, the ombudsman can require the solicitor to pay up 
to £50,000, although the average compensation award is under £250.161  
Progressive courts, regulators, and bar associations in the United States 
should study the Australian and U.K. experiences to determine if features of 
their systems could be adapted to resolve disputes and provide redress to 
injured consumers. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1976, a federal judge wrote:  “The time has come for lawyers to be 
responsible for their mistakes and their lack of attention to their 
professional responsibilities.”162  Forty years later, it is time to reexamine 
whether our civil liability regime provides meaningful remedies to 
numerous consumers injured by attorney misconduct.  Jurists and other 
decision makers who recognize the full scope of challenges faced by 
malpractice plaintiffs should be less inclined to extend additional 
protections to attorneys and may even support changes that better balance 
the interests of lawyers and those they injure.  Most importantly, lawyers 
who advocate access to justice and professionalism should be the first to 
support developments that provide avenues for holding lawyers accountable 
for their professional misdeeds. 
 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Decisions made by the legal ombudsman are subject to judicial review. Id. 
 162. Brown v. E.W. Bliss Co., 72 F.R.D. 198, 200 (D. Md. 1976). 
